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COLD PIAZZA: JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
CHAPTER 7 “FOR CAUSE” PROVISION
ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit focusing on the role of an implied good faith inquiry in the
“for cause” provision in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The decision in
Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare (In re Piazza) contributes to a purported circuit
split on whether the “for cause” provision should be the locus for an implied
good faith inquiry or whether such an inquiry should be left to other parts of
the Code. Circuit courts that embrace an implied good faith inquiry in the
“for cause” provision are further fractured on the question of the nature of the
test that should be applied.
This Comment argues that the circuit split on the implied good faith inquiry
is an illusion. All circuit courts that have examined the issue would likely
consider the same behaviors to be grounds for dismissal for bad faith in a
future case. The more critical issue for debtors and creditors in bankruptcy is
discord among the courts of appeals with regard to the implied good faith test.
This Comment argues that multifactor tests like the one endorsed in Piazza are
counteractive to the goal of the implied good faith inquiry, namely deterring
abuse of the bankruptcy system. Further, by applying a rule-like factor test, the
Piazza court creates harsh results for debtors through the inherent over- and
under-inclusivity of such tests. Invoking jurisprudential concerns, this
Comment concludes that the best application of the implied good faith inquiry
is an amorphous good faith standard that allows bankruptcy judges maximum
discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
Out of the over 800,000 debtors that filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the twelve-month period ending on
March 31, 2013, 25,579 of them filed with predominantly business debts.1
Owing to uncertainty in a pivotal area of bankruptcy law,2 individual debtors
ought to have considered how their prepetition behavior would appear to the
bankruptcy judge assigned their case. If a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
in a jurisdiction with a stringent good faith standard, her case might be
dismissed—allowing creditors to pursue their claims at any cost—for behavior
that many debtors might find ordinary or routine in contemplating bankruptcy.3
A proliferation of different approaches in different jurisdictions regarding
eligibility for bankruptcy has generated significant confusion about the role of
a debtor’s prebankruptcy behavior in determining her eligibility for bankruptcy
relief.4 It creates harsh results among those not properly on notice as to a
particular jurisdiction’s requirements of good faith, induces practice problems
for attorneys looking to advise their clients on their chances of success in
bankruptcy, raises structural and administrative concerns,5 and prompts the
potential for forum shopping by debtors.6

1 U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS, BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2013/0313_f2.pdf.
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012) (allowing bankruptcy judges to dismiss a bankruptcy case for behaviors
including “unreasonable delay . . . prejudicial to creditors,” “nonpayment of any fees or charges required,” and
“failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file” certain documents associated with the bankruptcy).
3 For an example of such behavior, see the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of
the debtor’s claims of routine behavior in In re Piazza. Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC
(In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In response, Piazza acknowledged that his debt to
Nueterra ‘may well have been the motivating factor for filing bankruptcy’ when he did. But, Piazza argued,
‘[f]iling bankruptcy to avoid a garnishment is common practice and hardly justifies a claim of bad faith.’”
(alteration in original)).
4 Katie Thein Kimlinger & William P. Wassweiler, The Good Faith Fable of 11 U.S.C. § 707(a): How
Bankruptcy Courts Have Invented a Good Faith Filing Requirement for Chapter 7 Debtors, 13 BANKR. DEV. J.
61, 78 (1996) (“§ 707(a) becomes a mechanism by which courts, without the express or even implied direction
of Congress, deny a debtor’s right to the bankruptcy forum on the basis of a nonstandard ‘smell test.’” (quoting
Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1127 (6th Cir. 1991))).
5 See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration,
60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 388 (2012) (“The inattention given to Congress’s choice of delegate in the bankruptcy
sphere is unfortunate because, given the significant differences between courts and agencies, Congress’s
choice of delegate implicates important questions of institutional design.”).
6 Cf. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement:
Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 955 n.108 (1991).
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When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,7 it expressly
embraced (with few exceptions)8 the ability of any person or business to file
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.9 And yet, to prevent too wide a berth for potential
filers, Congress simultaneously enacted several provisions that constrain
eligibility for bankruptcy’s protections.10 These provisions reflect an important
policy choice by Congress: bankruptcy provides unique capabilities that allow
needy debtors to pursue a fresh start in their lives or the lives of their
businesses. That said, these capabilities should not be available to debtors
when they seek to use bankruptcy as a shortcut to shirk their creditors.11
One of the fundamental tools Congress gave bankruptcy courts to police
abusive filings was the ability to dismiss a Chapter 7 filing “for cause.”12 As
enacted in 1978,13 the “for cause” provision applied to all debtors and allowed
a bankruptcy judge to dismiss for behaviors including “unreasonable
delay . . . prejudicial to creditors,” “nonpayment of any fees or charges
required,” and “failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file” certain
documents associated with the bankruptcy.14 Because the Bankruptcy Code
construes “including” as “not limiting,”15 the three listed behaviors are
illustrative rather than exhaustive, meaning that courts can dismiss a case for
any number of reasons that they find constitute “cause.”16

7 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in
Title 11 of the United States Code).
8 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012). These exceptions are limited to entities like railroads, banks, and foreign
insurance companies. Id.
9 Id. § 109.
10 See, e.g., id. § 105(a) (allowing a court to sua sponte make any order that will prevent an abuse of the
bankruptcy process); id. § 707(a) (allowing a court to dismiss a case “for cause” in a Chapter 7 dispute);
id. § 1112(b) (allowing a court to dismiss a case “for cause” in a Chapter 11 dispute); id. § 1307(c) (allowing a
court to dismiss a case “for cause” in a Chapter 13 dispute).
11 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-726, at 4 (2008) (finding that Congress enacted the “substantial abuse”
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) to respond “to concerns that some debtors who could easily pay their creditors
might resort to chapter 7 to avoid their obligations” (citing ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 707.04, at 707–25 (15th ed. rev. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Neal v.
Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878) (emphasizing that Congress’s “object and intention . . . in enacting” bankruptcy
laws was to relieve “honest citizen[s] . . . from the burden of hopeless insolvency” (emphasis added)).
12 11 U.S.C. § 707(a). Congress enacted nearly identical provisions in both the Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. §§ 1112(b), 1307. For a discussion of the Code’s eligibility
provisions, see Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 921 n.7.
13 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
14 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
15 Id. § 102(3).
16 See, e.g., Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1266–
67 (11th Cir. 2013).
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The 1978 version of the Chapter 7 “for cause” provision applied regardless
of the nature of debt.17 But when Congress promulgated the 1984 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code,18 a new provision took responsibility for handling
abuse in consumer debtor cases.19 Although consumer debtor cases can still be
dismissed under the “for cause” provision, it is most often utilized when the
debtor submits his petition with 50.1% of debts relating to business ventures.20
Despite the relative ease of knowing when to apply the “for cause” provision in
any given Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the polysemous nature of “for cause” has
created an array of questions as to both the nature and extent of its application.
One fundamental question is whether Congress intended bankruptcy courts
administering a Chapter 7 case to use the “for cause” provision to apply an
implied good faith requirement.21 Answering in the affirmative compels
another question: what test should bankruptcy courts use to enforce the implied
good faith requirement? Courts around the nation have ostensibly split
(highlighted by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in In re Piazza)22 both

17 The text of the provision, unlike the “consumer abuse” provision in § 707(b), does not qualify to
whom or what it applies. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b).
18 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. III, § 312,
98 Stat. 333, 355 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
19 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). This provision is known as the consumer abuse provision, and creates substantial
hurdles for “debtor[s] . . . whose debts are primarily consumer debts.” Id. § 707(b)(1). Consumer debtors must
satisfy the means test, under which a bankruptcy judge will presume abuse if the debtor’s income is too high.
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). Even if a debtor satisfies the means test, the Code instructs bankruptcy judges to inquire
whether the debtor is filing in bad faith or otherwise demonstrates abuse of the system. Id. § 707(b)(3).
20 Under the Bankruptcy Code, “consumer debt” is defined as “debt incurred by an individual primarily
for a personal, family, or household purpose.” Id. § 101(8). For an exhaustive treatment of the catalogue of
questions relating to the issue of “primarily consumer debts,” see In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 806–08 (10th
Cir. 1999). The court in that case noted several cases distinguishing “consumer debt” from “non-consumer”
(or business) debt, with the latter being “debt incurred with a ‘profit motive.’” Id. at 806 (quoting Citizens
Nat’l Bank v. Burns (In re Burns), 894 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir. 1990)) (some internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, the court indicated that most non-bankruptcy courts that have parsed the matter held
“primarily” to mean “more than fifty percent.” Id. at 808.
21 See, e.g., In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1260 (“The threshold issue in this case is whether prepetition bad
faith constitutes ‘cause’ to dismiss involuntarily a Chapter 7 petition under § 707(a).”); cf. Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 945 (“Even those who oppose implying nonstatutory conditions on access to
bankruptcy relief do not do so on the basis, moral or otherwise, that parties should be free to act in bad faith.
Therefore, to phrase the issue as whether there should or should not be a good faith filing requirement is to
miss the point.”).
22 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d 1253.
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on the fundamental question23 and on the derivative question.24
This Comment argues that, despite the claims made in In re Piazza, the
circuit split on the implied good faith requirement in the “for cause” provision
is illusory. The true circuit split on this issue—the nature of the application of
the implied good faith requirement—is significantly more problematic, and the
Piazza court has endorsed an overly rule-like test that will create hardship on
Chapter 7 debtors. Part I details the history of the implied good faith
requirement, discusses core themes of bankruptcy, and outlines the current
application of the requirement by U.S. Courts of Appeals.25 Part II reviews the
Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of the implied good faith question both in terms
of its foundation in the “for cause” provision and its appropriate application.26
Part III discusses why the purported circuit split on the “for cause” provision is
illusory and suggests that the appropriate test for bankruptcy courts should be
an open-ended, amorphous standard.27 Finally, Part IV considers
countervailing concerns and implications of those proposals.28
I. THE IMPLIED GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT AND BANKRUPTCY
Creating the most desirable application of the implied good faith
requirement necessitates reviewing the history of the test and its relationship to
the goals of bankruptcy. Section A describes the history of the implied good
faith requirement as utilized by bankruptcy courts over the last one hundred
and fifty years. Section B illustrates the core of bankruptcy, which includes
promoting a debtor’s fresh start and the efficient collection of debts. Section C
features the treatment of the “for cause” provision and implied good faith
23 Compare In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the “for cause” provision
includes an implied good faith requirement), Dinova v. Harris (In re Dinova), 212 B.R. 437, 442 (B.A.P. 2d
Cir. 1997) (same), and Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991) (same),
with In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that bad faith does not provide “cause” to
dismiss a Chapter 7 petition, while some conduct that would provide “cause” may be characterized as bad
faith), and Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
24 Compare In re Gilman, No. 11-06036-8-SWH, 2012 WL 1230276, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 12,
2012) (imposing a fourteen-factor totality-of-the-circumstances test for the “for cause” inquiry), and In re
O’Brien, 328 B.R. 669, 675 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (imposing fourteen-factor totality of the circumstances
test for the “for cause” inquiry), with In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d at 207 (holding that courts must determine good
faith “only on an ad hoc basis,” examining “whether the petitioner has abused the provisions, purpose, and
spirit of bankruptcy law”), and In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1129 (holding that courts must determine good faith on
“an ad hoc basis”).
25 See infra Part I.
26 See infra Part II.
27 See infra Part III.
28 See infra Part IV.
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requirement in federal courts of appeals to lay the foundation for the argument
that any circuit split between them is illusory.
A. The History of the Implied Good Faith Requirement
Understanding the history of the “for cause” provision is an important
element to understanding why the good faith requirement is implied in the
Code. For the purposes of this Comment, several principles can be elucidated
from its history. First, Congress has chosen not to enact an express good faith
requirement for filing a bankruptcy petition in Chapter 7, despite definitively
knowing how to do so. Second, courts have nonetheless applied some form of
an implied good faith test since the early stages of bankruptcy law. Third,
Congress has given little guidance on the purposes of a good faith inquiry for
reorganization under Chapter 11 or rehabilitation under Chapter 13, and it has
given even less for liquidation under Chapter 7.
Early bankruptcy acts (in 1800,29 1841,30 1867,31 and 1898)32 did not
expressly compel a debtor to file for bankruptcy in good faith, nor did they
have a “for cause” provision at all. Nonetheless, “[e]very bankruptcy statute
since 1898 has incorporated literally, or by judicial interpretation, a standard of
good faith for the commencement, prosecution, and confirmation of
bankruptcy proceedings.”33 This incorporation continued even though the 1938
Chandler Act amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 189834 included an
express good faith requirement in its Chapter X reorganization provision.35
Despite the presence of express authorization to apply a good faith inquiry for
petition, courts continued to “impl[y] a similar requirement for petitions filed
under Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.”36

29

Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
31 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
32 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 12(d)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978).
33 Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Co. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068,
1071 (5th Cir. 1986).
34 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
35 Section 141 of the Chandler Act (the former 11 U.S.C. § 541) added a provision requiring a petition
for reorganization to be approved by a judge as having been filed in good faith. See § 141, 52 Stat. at 887;
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 922 n.10.
36 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 922 n.10.
30
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In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,37 while enacting the “for cause”
provision itself, Congress omitted any express good faith requirement for filing
a petition in any Chapter.38 As the legislative history does not elucidate why an
express requirement was omitted, several commenters have stipulated theories
behind the gap.39 For example, Professors Lawrence Ponoroff and Stephen
Knippenberg posit that Congress was heeding the advice of its Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws40 that “it was premature for the court to determine at filing
whether or not bad faith existed.”41 Despite the Commission’s advice, “from
very early on, courts recognized that the power to screen for and appropriately
respond to bad faith in filing was implicit in the general equitable powers of
the court.”42 The bankruptcy reforms in 198443 and 200544 left the “for cause”
provision unchanged and refrained from enacting an express good faith filing
requirement.
B. The Core of Bankruptcy
The core of bankruptcy plays a critical role in a policy-driven approach to
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. For example, whether it is more desirable to
have a multifactor test, a bright-line rule, or an amorphous standard for the
37 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended as Title 11
of the United States Code). This was the next major round of reforms after the 1930 reforms.
38 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 922 n.10. Good faith requirements were expressly enacted
for the purposes of plan proposal in Chapters 11, 12, and 13. Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 4, at 64.
39 See infra notes 41–42.
40 “Congress established the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to ‘study, analyze,
evaluate, and recommend changes’ in existing bankruptcy law.” Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6,
at 922 n.10.
41 Id. at 923 n.10; see also Empire Enters., Inc. v. Koopmans (In re Koopmans), 22 B.R. 395, 403
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (hypothesizing that the ability to convert a case to a Chapter 7 liquidation may have
been the reason that the good faith requirement was omitted from the reorganization chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code).
42 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 923 n.10; see also In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549,
558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (“It would be more than anomalous to conclude that . . . Congress intended to do
away with a safeguard against abuse and misuse of process which had been established and accepted as part of
bankruptcy philosophy . . . for almost a century.”).
43 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(codified as amended in Titles 11 and 28 of the United States Code). Congress did respond to the demands of
creditors and enacted Section 707(b) to give bankruptcy courts more authority to dismiss debtors with
“primarily consumer” debt for “substantial abuse.” See Bradley R. Tamm, Substantial Abuse Dismissal Under
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b): Evolution or Malignancy, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 47, 56–57 (2004).
44 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(codified as amended in Title 11 of the United States Code). It is important to note, however, that Congress
chose in this round of amendments to significantly augment the gatekeeping function of Section 707(b) with
regards to consumer debtors. See supra notes 18–19. This indicates Congress’s sensitivity to the idea of abuse
in the context of Chapter 7.
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implied good faith inquiry turns on whether you believe bankruptcy should
function as a means to efficient ordering of creditors or a method to minimize
externalities caused by the debtor’s financial failure.45 This section seeks to
summarize the important goals of bankruptcy with an eye towards utilizing
them to fashion the appropriate framework for the implied good faith
requirement set forth in Part III.
Courts and commentators alike agree that the two primary goals of
bankruptcy are enabling a “fresh start” by the debtor and efficiently ordering
creditors for repayment of their claims.46 The Code has several provisions in
each chapter that illustrate congressional concern that the debtor obtain a
“fresh start”47: when the debtor files his petition for bankruptcy, an automatic
stay arises by operation of law that prevents creditors from pursuing their
claims and allows debtors the opportunity to get their finances in order;48 the
exemption provisions of the Code allow debtors to keep certain items Congress
has deemed necessary to allow them to reset their financial lives after their
debts are discharged;49 and the discharge provision of Chapter 7 requires courts
to discharge the debtor’s prepetition debts, a powerful tool giving debtors the
opportunity to regain their status as productive members of society.50 Further,
the “efficient ordering” prong is illustrated primarily by the Code’s priority51
and distribution provisions,52 both of which organize the debtor’s assets in
order to pay off creditors.
While there is broad acceptance of the primary goals of bankruptcy, the
process by which these goals should be administered has created a scholarly
divide.53 One group of theorists, dubbed either collectivists or proceduralists,
believes that judges and trustees should administer bankruptcy to promote
45 Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design,
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 566 (2001) (“Broadly speaking, the two camps split along two axes. The first division is
normative, over whether Congress or bankruptcy judges should pursue redistributive goals in the name of
‘bankruptcy policy.’ The proceduralists view the sole goal of bankruptcy as generating the highest return for
creditors, while traditionalists see a role in bankruptcy for protecting groups harmed by failure . . . .”).
46 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 947.
47 See, e.g., Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 4, at 70.
48 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). For example, if a landlord threatened to evict the landlord, he would be legally
obligated to withhold from doing so, under pain of injunction and punitive damages. Id. § 362(a)(3).
49 Id. § 522. For example, a debtor can utilize state law exemptions to retain their homestead or can
exempt $22,975 of its residence under the Code. Id. § 522(d)(1).
50 Id. § 727.
51 Id. § 507 (setting the order for priority claimants to a debtor’s estate).
52 Id. § 726 (authorizing the distribution of the property of the debtor in a liquidation proceeding).
53 See infra notes 54–58.
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efficient debt collection.54 Another group of theorists, known as the
traditionalists, recognizes the importance of debt collection but see it as one of
many competing concerns a bankruptcy judge must balance when adjudicating
a case.55 Bankruptcy scholar Ted Janger conceives of the disagreement as
amounting to a conceptual dissonance of the kind of debtor bankruptcy law is
designed to serve: collectivists see the common debtor as a single restaurant
offering bad food; traditionalists see the common debtor as a large factory that
is failing.56 A robust market economy can absorb the failure of the restaurant
without much stress, indicating that the primary function of bankruptcy should
be ensuring that the restaurant’s creditors are paid.57 The failure of a factory,
however, is destined to produce a variety of hardships on its workers, those
that buy its products, and the community that surrounds it.58
These goals in bankruptcy “drive[] one’s view of how decision-making
authority ought to be allocated between the statute, judges, and the market.”59
In the specific context of the “for cause” provision, if a court takes the view
that efficient debt collection is the main goal of bankruptcy, it will likely
embrace a stringent good faith standard with a bright-line rule.60 Conversely, if
a court is more sympathetic to the idea that bankruptcy should be used to take
into account a multitude of concerns, it will likely apply a more open-ended
good faith requirement.61 Such fundamental decisions have and will shape the
application of the “for cause” provision in federal courts.
C. The Implied Good Faith Requirement in Federal Courts
Federal courts have split as to both the fundamental question of whether the
“for cause” provision should be the locus of the implied good faith inquiry and
54 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 948; see also Janger, supra note 45, at 569 (“Under the
proceduralist view . . . the role of bankruptcy law and of the bankruptcy judge is limited to conquering this
collective action problem and preventing inefficient liquidations.”).
55 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 959; see also Janger, supra note 45, at 569–71. Janger takes
a more nuanced view of the traditionalist model, positing that its denizens are concerned more with the
spillover effects and externalities of a bankruptcy filing than inefficient liquidations. Id.
56 Janger, supra note 45, at 569–71. While the Knippenberg & Ponoroff article fails to use a similar
analogy, its discussion of the two schools of thought roughly tracks Janger’s discussion. Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, supra note 6, at 948–62.
57 Janger, supra note 45, at 569–71.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 572.
60 Such a standard will lead to more debtors having their case dismissed than is customary.
61 Such a requirement will allow the court greater involvement and discretion to decide individual cases
on the merits and will lead to fewer debtors having their case dismissed.
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how such an inquiry should be administered.62 Further, some courts of appeals
have addressed the question while others have not, forcing bankruptcy judges
to rely on various district court and bankruptcy court opinions on the matter.63
Only the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals64 has addressed the issue since the
drastic reforms to this area of the Code in 2005.65 As such, there will be more
development of the implied good faith requirement in the coming years.
The majority of jurisdictions agree that the “for cause” provision should
feature an implied good faith inquiry.66 Of these jurisdictions, the majority
favor using an amorphous, ad hoc standard that allows bankruptcy judges wide
latitude to dismiss a case based on its facts.67 Others have decided that a strict
factor test is an appropriate inquiry.68
The courts that have argued that the “for cause” provision is an
inappropriate container for the implied good faith inquiry have characterized
their opinion in two ways. First, courts should treat Section 707(a) as its plain
meaning suggests, evaluating the debtor’s behavior and determining whether
“cause” (including behavior that might be considered bad faith) exists to
dismiss the case.69 Second, there are other provisions in the Code that are
sufficient to screen bad faith debtors.70
62

See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the
former U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Second Circuit, have addressed this question directly. Piazza v.
Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2013); In re
Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2000); Dinova v.
Harris (In re Dinova), 212 B.R. 437, 442 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997); Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt),
39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994); Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir.
1991). For representative opinions from other jurisdictions, see In re Gilman, No. 11-06036-8-SWH, 2012 WL
1230276 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2012); In re Lots by Murphy, Inc., 430 B.R. 431 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010);
In re Linehan, 326 B.R. 474 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re Pedigo, 296 B.R. 485, 488 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
2003) (collecting cases), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Pedigo, 329 B.R. 47 (S.D. Ind.
2005); In re Etcheverry, 242 B.R. 503 (D. Colo. 1999).
64 See infra Part II.
65 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
68 In re Gilman, 2012 WL 1230276, at *2–3 (adopting a fourteen-factor test to determine a debtor’s
eligibility for bankruptcy); In re Pedigo, 296 B.R. at 488 n.2 (adopting a six-factor test to determine a debtor’s
eligibility for bankruptcy).
69 See, e.g., Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[S]ome conduct
constituting cause to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition may readily be characterized as bad faith. But framing the
issue in terms of bad faith may tend to misdirect the inquiry away from the fundamental principles . . . of
Chapter 7. Thus, . . . the § 707(a) analysis is better conducted under the statutory standard, ‘for cause.’”).
70 In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing several other means by which
bankruptcy judges can dismiss a case for bad faith).
63
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One court has decided that the implied good faith inquiry should trigger
burden shifting, with the burden on the debtor to prove that she filed in good
faith.71 No other jurisdiction follows this approach.
As this Comment will discuss in Part II, a recent court holding has split the
baby between the questions of whether the “for cause” provision should
contain an implied good faith requirement and the nature of the test that should
be applied. As such, this decision has sown additional discord among federal
courts on the question.72
II. EXPLANATION OF IN RE PIAZZA
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in In re Piazza73 that
bankruptcy courts could dismiss a case for bad faith under the “for cause”
provision74 and that a fifteen-factor examination is an appropriate application
of the bad faith test.75 Whether the “for cause” provision allows a bankruptcy
court to dismiss a case for lack of good faith was an issue of first impression in
the Eleventh Circuit, and the court indicated it must be assessed against the
backdrop of a circuit split.76 Ultimately, the court concluded that the plain
meaning of “for cause” permits a bankruptcy court to engage in a good faith
analysis,77 rejected several counterarguments by Piazza,78 and articulated a
general standard by which the good faith inquiry should be conducted.79 This
Part will demonstrate, through the Piazza court’s reasoning, that the “for
cause” provision is the appropriate home for the implied good faith inquiry.
The facts of the case presented an issue of first impression for the Eleventh
Circuit and allowed it to resolve the issue by reading an implied good faith
requirement into the “for cause” provision. Craig Piazza filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy on October 8, 2010, declaring $319,683 in debt, all of which was
unsecured.80 According to Piazza’s schedules, more than half of his unsecured
debt ($161,383) derived from an adverse judgment relating to a business
71

In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000).
See infra Part II.
73 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013).
74 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012).
75 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1271–72.
76 Id. at 1260.
77 Id. at 1262.
78 Id. at 1262–71.
79 Id. at 1271–72.
80 Voluntary Petition at 18 sched.F, In re Piazza, No. 10-40807-JKO (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2010),
ECF No. 1.
72
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guarantee to Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy.81 On January 18, 2011,
Nueterra brought a motion to dismiss the filing under the abuse-dismissal
framework, which permits a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 “case filed by an
individual debtor . . . whose debts are primarily consumer debts . . . if it finds
that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of
[Chapter 7].”82 Despite Nueterra’s motion, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida ordered Piazza’s case dismissed under the “for
cause” provision for lack of good faith in filing.83 The court acknowledged that
the Eleventh Circuit had never clarified whether a bankruptcy judge could use
the “for cause” provision to dismiss a case under an implied good faith
requirement and, ipso facto, had never adopted a test for finding bad faith.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court—relying on several other Florida district
court and bankruptcy court decisions84 in holding that a bankruptcy judge may
use the “for cause” provision to dismiss for “bad faith”—found that a
fifteen-factor test was required.85
Under the framework of the test, a bankruptcy judge can dismiss a case for
various abusive behaviors, including not making appropriate lifestyle
adjustments, filing bankruptcy to avoid repaying a single large debt, or not
making a full and honest disclosure on the bankruptcy filing.86 The fifteen
81

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1); see also Creditor, Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC Motion to
Dismiss Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) & Request for Clerk to Hold Discharge Pending Hearing, In re
Piazza, No. 10-40807-JKO (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011), ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
Nueterra argued that Piazza had neglected to include consumer debts related to a car loan that would have
raised his unsecured debt to $332,981. Motion to Dismiss, supra, at 3. If this debt had been included, Piazza’s
consumer debt would have been raised to more than half of his total unsecured debt (meaning his debts would
be “primarily consumer”), making him eligible for the means test in Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) and the bad faith
and “totality of the circumstances” tests in Section 707(b)(3). Id. Nueterra argued that Piazza would fail the
means test or, in the alternative, would fail the “totality of the circumstances” test. Id. at 5.
83 In re Piazza, 451 B.R. 608, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011). The Bankruptcy Court endorsed Nueterra’s
findings with regard to Piazza’s omission of the consumer debt related to a car but posited that Nueterra
neglected to recognize that Piazza should also have declared $48,441 in interest on the unpaid judgment on
Piazza’s business guarantee to Nueterra. Id. at 612–13. As such, with both the interest on the adverse judgment
and the car debt factored in, Piazza’s debts remained primarily business debts and not subject to
Section 707(b)’s abuse provisions. Id.
84 See In re Baird, 456 B.R. 112, 116–17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (adopting a fifteen-factor totality of the
circumstances test for bad faith); In re Boca Village Ass’n, 422 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding
that Section 707(a)’s “for cause” provisions include an implied good faith requirement); In re Kane & Kane,
406 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding that Section 707(a)’s “for cause” provisions include an
implied good faith requirement).
85 In re Piazza, 451 B.R. at 614–15.
86 Id. (citing, inter alia, In re Baird, 456 B.R. at 116–17; In re Scott, No. 10-00794-8-JRL, 2010 WL
3087507, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010)).
82
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factors87 are not dispositive, and although the presence of one factor may not
indicate bad faith, the presence of several factors may be sufficient.88 Using
this test, the bankruptcy court made a finding of bad faith for the following
reasons: (1) Piazza had petitioned for bankruptcy “in response to” and in order
to “avoid” a single large debt stemming from an adverse judgment;89 (2) he
had failed to change his lifestyle in concert with filing bankruptcy and “had
sufficient resources to pay his debts;”90 and (3) he had been “paying the debts
of insiders.”91 On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court on all counts.92
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the panel agreed that the “for cause”
provision includes an implied good faith requirement.93 The first part of the
court’s opinion used canons of construction to assess whether “for cause” can
be inclusive of a good faith analysis.94 The court began by referencing
dictionaries from the late 1970s to demonstrate that the ordinary meaning of
“cause” is “adequate or sufficient reason” and that it “comports not only with
dictionary definitions but also with judicial understandings of that term.”95
Invoking policy considerations—including the need to keep the number of
Chapter 7 filings from overwhelming bankruptcy courts and to protect their
“jurisdictional integrity”—the court then decided that there was “adequate and

87 In re Baird, 456 B.R. at 116–17 (“(i) [T]he debtor reduced his creditors to a single creditor shortly
before the petition date; (ii) the debtor made no life-style adjustments or continued living a lavish life-style;
(iii) the debtor filed the case in response to a judgment, pending litigation, or collection action; (iv) there is an
intent to avoid a large, single debt; (v) the debtor made no effort to repay his debts; (vi) the unfairness of the
use of Chapter 7; (vii) the debtor has sufficient resources to pay his debts; (viii) the debtor is paying debts of
insiders; (ix) the schedules inflate expenses to disguise financial well-being; (x) the debtor transferred assets;
(xi) the debtor is over-utilizing the protections of the Bankruptcy Code to the unconscionable detriment of
creditors; (xii) the debtor employed a deliberate and persistent pattern of evading a single major creditor;
(xiii) the debtor failed to make candid and full disclosure; (xiv) the debtor’s debts are modest in relation to his
assets and income; and (xv) there are multiple bankruptcy filings or other procedural ‘gymnastics.’”).
88 In re Piazza, 451 B.R. at 615.
89 Id. at 616.
90 Id. at 616–17.
91 Id. at 616 (“The Debtor also intends to continue making certain mortgage payments on property
occupied by his aunt, even though his personal liability would be discharged, and regularly transfers
significant amounts to his wife for her 401(k), credit card payments, and other expenses.”).
92 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC, 469 B.R. 388, 389 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
93 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1260–61 (11th
Cir. 2013).
94 Id. at 1261–62.
95 Id. For a different examination of whether “for cause” includes a good faith requirement as an issue of
first impression that eschews “ordinary meaning” analysis in favor of other canons of construction and policy
concerns, see In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1191–94 (9th Cir. 2000).
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sufficient reason” to allow bankruptcy judges to sound Chapter 7 filings for
bad faith through the “for cause” provision.96
The court then rejected the four counterarguments put forth by Piazza’s
counsel as unpersuasive compared to the weight of statutory construction
evidence in favor of the implied good faith inquiry.97 Examining these four
counterarguments is important, as they demonstrate the inherent difficulties
plaguing judicial application of the implied good faith standard in the “for
cause” provision.
First, Piazza argued, pursuant to the ejusdem generis canon,98 that the
provision’s examples should be limited to other inquiries similar in nature.99
The court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, applying ejusdem
generis to the examples listed in the “for cause” provision supported, rather
than undermined, the application of an implied good faith filing requirement to
Chapter 7 cases.100 Each of the examples can be considered bad-faith behaviors
for the purposes of the “for cause” inquiry.101 Second, restricting the examples
in the “for cause” provision to nearly identical practices would contravene the
settled meaning of “for cause” in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code;102 the
“for cause” provisions in Chapter 11103 and Chapter 13104 are widely held to
include implied good faith filing requirements.105 As such, and because the
Supreme Court has required language to be interpreted consistently across a

96

In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1262–71.
98 Id. at 1262–63. The court points out that Piazza wrongly invoked the ejusdem generis canon, which is
generally reserved for interpreting lists of criteria that finish with general language. Id. at 1236 n.4. The
appropriate canon to be used with words like “including” at the start of the list of criteria should be noscitur a
sociis, under which a word is construed according to the common definition of those words around it. Id.
99 Id. at 1262.
100 Id. at 1263.
101 Id.
102 Id. The court also notes that interpreting a good faith filing requirement out of Section 707(a) would
disrupt “more than a century of federal bankruptcy law and policy.” Id. at 1264. “With only minor exception,
the power of bankruptcy courts under § 707 to dismiss ‘for cause’ has, since its enactment, been understood by
courts as the power to prevent ‘manifestly inequitable result[s].’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing In re
Pagnotta, 22 B.R. 521, 522–23 (Bankr. Md. 1982)).
103 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012).
104 Id. § 1307(c).
105 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1263 (interpreting “for cause” under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) as encompassing
“prepetition bad-faith conduct” (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007)));
Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir.
1988) (interpreting “for cause” under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) as including a lack of good faith).
97
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group of related statutes,106 the court held that an implied good faith filing is
required in the “for cause” provision.107
Second, Piazza argued that interpreting the “for cause” provision to include
an implied good faith inquiry would render superfluous the consumer abuse
provision’s bad faith inquiry and totality of the circumstances test.108 The court
parried these concerns by noting several distinguishing factors between the
good faith requirements in the two sections.109 First, they contemplate different
categories of debtors—the consumer abuse provision expressly applies to
debtors with “primarily consumer debts,”110 whereas the “for cause” provision
applies by implication to debtors with primarily business debts.111 Second,
failing the means test in the consumer abuse provision levies a presumption of
abuse upon a debtor that she may rebut, whereas the “for cause” provision
allows a bankruptcy court to dismiss a case outright.112 Finally, the court
posited that accepting Piazza’s superfluity argument would render the
distinction (or lack thereof) between the bad faith and totality of the
circumstances subsections meaningless.113 The bad faith inquiry would make
superfluous the totality of the circumstances test, as both provisions ask the
bankruptcy court to look into the totality of the circumstances of the debtor.114
Third, Piazza argued that other specific sections of the Code, namely
Sections 523(a)(19)(B)(i)115 and 727(a)(2)(A),116 provide specific authority to
106

In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1264 (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read
the same way each time it appears.” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (stating that the Bankruptcy
Code must be interpreted so that “equivalent words have equivalent meaning”).
107 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1271. The court also rejected the notion that the “for cause” provisions in
Chapters 11 and 13 should be treated differently because they contemplate a post-petition relationship between
creditors and debtors. Id. at 1265 (“In Marrama, the Supreme Court made clear bad faith is pertinent in all
Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of whether a provision contains an explicit good-faith filing
requirement.” (citing Marrama, 549 U.S. at 373–75)).
108 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1265–67.
109 Id.
110 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012).
111 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1266.
112 Id. The court also noted that Section 707(b) provides “remedial options” (namely conversion of the
debtor’s case into Chapter 11 or Chapter 13) that Section 707(a) does not. Id.
113 Id. at 1267.
114 Id.
115 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(B)(i). This provision contemplates the discharge of a single debt that
“results . . . from . . . any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or State judicial or
administrative proceeding.” Id.
116 Id. § 727(a)(2)(A). This provision contemplates a total denial of discharge when the debtor, with
“intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under
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dismiss a case for bad faith and that their presence should control the general
language in the “for cause” provision.117 The court dismissed this argument by
marshaling several other canons of construction to support its conclusion and
by distinguishing the three sections from each other.118 The court
acknowledged that while the “specific controls the general”119 canon is an
important one,120 it is not always dispositive to statutory interpretation121 and
may be overcome by “textual indications” elsewhere in the statute.122 These
“textual indications,” along with the overall structure of the Code, show that a
bankruptcy judge should receive the latitude to dismiss a case for bad faith
under the “for cause” provision.123 For example, the court opined that
Section 105(a), which gives a bankruptcy judge the ability to dismiss a case
sua sponte, is indicative of a larger policy expressed by Congress that
bankruptcy judges should have the ability to dismiss a case for abusive debtor
actions.124 This arguably indicates that a bankruptcy judge should have a
similar power to dismiss under an implied good faith requirement in
Section 707(a).125 Further, the differences in application between
Sections 523(a)(19)(B)(i), 727(a)(2)(A), and the “for cause” provision operate
to undermine the “specific controls the general” canon: “As the bankruptcy
court in this case correctly reasoned, §§ 707(a), 727(a), and 523(a) ‘provide
very different remedies under different circumstances’ and are ‘not directly at
odds.’”126 Thus, because the provisions fail to be applicable in concert with
one another, the “specific controls the general” canon is not implicated.127
this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed . . . property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition.” Id.
117 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1267–68.
118 Id.
119 Professor Margaret Lemos defines the “specific controls the general” canon as when “specific
provisions targeting a particular issue apply instead of provisions more generally covering the issue.”
MARGARET LEMOS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 4 (2012), http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/
files/Statutory%20Construction%20-%20Lemos%20summary%20-%20PLPL%202012.pdf.
120 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1267.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1267–68.
123 Id.
124 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); see also Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 148–49 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that Section 105(a) may be an omnibus provision, but that does not mean that it divests other
more specific bad faith provisions).
125 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1267–68.
126 Id. at 1268 (quoting In re Piazza, 460 B.R. 322, 325 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011)). For example,
Section 707(a) allows a Court to dismiss a case or transfer the case into a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 setting.
Sections 727(a) and 523 involve either total denial of a discharge or the discharge of an individual debt, which
is more a remedy for the creditor rather than the debtor. See id.
127 Id.
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Finally, Piazza argued that congressional amendment128 of the consumer
abuse provision to include the term “bad faith” demonstrates, through the
“selective inclusion” presumption, that Congress intended to curtail the
implied good faith requirement in the “for cause” provision through negative
implication.129 The court responded that the “for cause” provision’s history,
text, and structure say otherwise.130 First, whereas Congress enacted the “for
cause” provision in the bankruptcy reforms in 1978,131 the bad-faith portion of
the consumer abuse provision was not promulgated until 2005.132 Congress did
not model these provisions after one another, nor did it intend them to be part
of the same package.133 The pattern and substance of the enactments indicate
that Congress was attempting to increase judicial ability to prevent bankruptcy
abuse, not to remove judicial discretion, as Piazza’s argument would
suggest.134 Further, while the text of the “for cause” provision is uncomplicated
in structure and phrased in general language, the “abuse” provision extends
over numerous subsections, includes the complicated means test135 formula
and is significantly more detailed.136 These differences illustrate that “the more
reasonable inference to be drawn from Congress’s decision not to amend [the
‘for cause’ provision] is that bad faith was already clearly encompassed within
the ordinary meaning of ‘for cause’ dismissal.”137
After establishing that a bankruptcy judge could consider bad faith when
dismissing a liquidation case under the “for cause” provision, the court
128

See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, tit. I,
§ 102(a)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 23, 27 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A) (West 2014)).
129 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1268–71. Before embarking on its specific efforts to disprove Piazza’s theory
of selective inclusion, the court mentioned that the selective inclusion canon is not always dispositive, and that
“we are not to draw sweeping inferences ‘from congressional silence’ when such inferences are ‘contrary to all
other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.’” Id. (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.
129, 136 (1991)).
130 Id.
131 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 707, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012)).
132 See In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1269; tit. I, § 102(a)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 27. Indeed, Section 707(b) was
not promulgated until 1984, in response to a consumer credit crisis. In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1269; Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. III, § 312, 98 Stat. 333, 355 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).
133 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1269.
134 Id. at 1270 (“Congress’s addition of a bad-faith provision to subsection (b) in 2005 was intended ‘to
correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system,’ not to limit bankruptcy courts’ ability to correct such
abuses in non-consumer cases . . . .” (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S.
229, 232 (2010))).
135 See supra note 19.
136 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1270.
137 Id. at 1271.
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purported to adopt a totality of the circumstances approach.138 Noting that
“[b]ad faith does not lend itself to a strict formula,”139 the court stated that a
bankruptcy judge should look for “‘atypical’ conduct that falls short of the
‘honest and forthright invocation of the [Bankruptcy] Code’s protections.’”140
A showing of bad faith is “evidenced by the debtor’s deliberate acts or
omissions that constitute a misuse or abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit
of the Bankruptcy Code.”141 “The bankruptcy court must articulate reasoned
bases and make adequate factual findings” when it dismisses a case under the
“for cause” provision.142 The court then endorsed the fifteen-factor Baird test
as acceptable and not an abuse of discretion.143
III. A MORE DESIRABLE IMPLIED GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
The questions posed by In re Piazza and similar cases fit within the
framework of a larger set of Bankruptcy Code issues: Congress has
promulgated a set of mandatory rules guiding the actions of debtors and
creditors that are insufficient on their face to provide for every contingency in
the hundreds and thousands of filings that occur every year.144 Bankruptcy
judges (and Article III judges after them) frequently function in a gap-filling
role that works to create several ambiguities within the Code.145 Each judge
must give their best reading of Congress’s intent in promulgating the Code as
seen through the text.146 Section A will suggest that the text-based arguments
of congressional intent in In re Piazza and the analogous cases in other circuits
suggest that the purported circuit split on the fundamental question is an
illusion. Section B will argue that jurisprudential concerns necessitate using an
amorphous standard to apply the implied good faith requirement.

138

Id.
Id.
140 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting, in turn, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375
n.11 (2007), and Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996)).
141 Id. at 1272 (quoting McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 74 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See, e.g., Pardo & Watts, supra note 5, at 404–05.
145 For a comprehensive list of ambiguities, see id.
146 For a comprehensive review of the scant amount of legislative history on the “for cause” provision, see
supra Part I.A.
139
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A. The “For Cause” Circuit Split Is Illusory
The two sides’ holdings on the “for cause” provision are not binary in
nature: one side holds that a bankruptcy judge can properly consider a
litigant’s bad faith under the section;147 the other side holds that “some conduct
constituting cause to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition may readily be characterized
as bad faith. But framing the issue in terms of bad faith may tend to misdirect
the inquiry away from the fundamental principles and purposes of
Chapter 7.”148 From a legal perspective, the distinction between these two tests
is slight. One side searches ex ante for bad faith by the debtor as one legitimate
exercise of the “for cause” provision, while the other side decides ex post if the
debtor’s behavior demonstrates sufficient bad faith to constitute “cause” to
dismiss the case. Functionally, the difference in application is negligible.149
The Piazza court compiled a significant amount of evidence to support its
argument to combat a considerable amount of evidence Piazza’s counsel put
forth on the subject of this requirement.150 This evidence is based on canons of
construction, structural concerns, and other legal arguments that can cut both
ways.151 In light of the fact that the decision to place a good faith inquiry in the
“for cause” provision is negligible in terms of real-world debtor behavior, the
nature of the arguments the Piazza court uses indicates the transience of the
decision: it can (and undoubtedly will) be easily rebuffed ad infinitum by any
number of legal arguments. This indicates that legal scholarship should
reexamine the nature of the circuit split to determine if it is what it purports to
be.
Each court of appeals that has addressed the issue has expressed approval
of an implied good faith test in the context of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.152 Further,
each court of appeals has expressed willingness to dismiss a case through the
147

See, e.g., supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994).
149 Compare id. at 830 (affirming dismissal of a case under the “for cause” provision when the debtor had
declared bankruptcy in order to avoid a divorce decree saddling him with a very large debt and taking a lower
paying job in order to reduce his assets available for discharge), with Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical
Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a case under the
“for cause” provision when the debtor had declared bankruptcy to avoid an adverse judgment saddling him
with a very large debt and had transferred money to his wife and aunt to reduce his assets available for
discharge).
150 See supra Part II.
151 See supra Part II.
152 See, e.g., In re Padilla, 222 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing several provisions that can
screen out debtors filing for bankruptcy in bad faith).
148
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“for cause” provision for conduct that resembles bad faith.153 As such, the
repeated assertions154 that a circuit split exists between various jurisdictions on
the nature of the “for cause” provision155 are based on appearance rather than
reality. If a bankruptcy judge can unambiguously classify a debtor as filing for
bankruptcy in bad faith with “primarily business” debt, the debtor will likely
be screened out of court through the “for cause” provision no matter what
jurisdiction she is in. The better solution is for courts to acknowledge the
hairline difference between the two sides of the difference in interpretation and
focus on the application of bad faith within the provision.
The varied applications of the implied good faith test form the most serious
roadblock to legal certainty and effectiveness. The Piazza court leaves the door
open for bankruptcy judges in the Eleventh Circuit to apply any standard as
long as it fits the general rubric set forth in the Baird case.156 However,
because the court endorses the Baird factors, it is likely that bankruptcy courts
in the Eleventh Circuit will utilize them as the de facto test for the implied
good faith inquiry. One decision that has been handed down in the Eleventh
Circuit since In re Piazza recites the Baird factors by rote, suggesting that the
true circuit split on this subject (the one with regard to the application of the
bad faith inquiry) has deepened.157 The Eleventh Circuit is the first to explicitly
endorse a multifactor test as the appropriate analysis.158 As this Comment
noted earlier, the other circuits espouse a number of amorphous standards and
factor tests.159
The plurality of approaches begs the question: what is the proper
application of the implied good faith requirement? Given that Congress has not
expressed an opinion one way or the other, “primarily business” debtors must
rely on judicial construction to structure their financial affairs so as to survive
dismissal “for cause.”

153

See supra Part I.C.
See, e.g., In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1260 (“This is a question of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,
and one that has divided our sister circuits.”).
155 That is to say, whether or not Section 707(a) includes the ability to dismiss a case on the grounds of
bad faith.
156 In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1272.
157 In re Bryant, 474 B.R. 770, 775–78 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2012).
158 See supra notes 138–43; see also Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 4, at 78 (“When all is said and
done, ‘[t]he facts required to mandate dismissal based upon a lack of good faith are as varied as the number of
cases.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Bingham, 68 B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1987))).
158 See In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1272.
159 See supra Part I.C.
154
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The rest of this Comment will explore the various options available to
bankruptcy judges in this exercise and evaluate their legal and normative
desirability. The ideal judicial mandate should be one that both fits within the
core of bankruptcy160 and one that is best suited to preventing abuse of the
Code. This Comment’s goal is not to retread old ground describing which
factors, if any, a good faith standard should feature;161 rather, it will approach
the question from a jurisprudential standpoint, evaluating the desirability of a
rule versus a standard.
B. A Standard Is Preferred to a Rule in Deterring Abuse
Professor Louis Kaplow, in his article Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, explains, “the only distinction between rules and standards
is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before
or after individuals act.”162 Rules are laws that bind judges or juries before the
transaction has occurred as to what behaviors constitute a violation; standards
give judges or juries the discretion to decide after the transaction has occurred
whether the defendant’s acts are permissible.163 Kaplow further concludes that
“[t]he central factor influencing the desirability of rules and standards is the
frequency with which a law will govern conduct;”164 that “when behavior
subject to the relevant law is frequent, standards tend to be more
costly . . . . [i]f behavior subject to the law is infrequent, however, standards
are likely to be preferable;”165 and that “[t]he simple rule overdeters [harmful
behaviors] by subjecting them to positive liability. . . . The simple rule
underdeters [harmful behaviors] covered by the law by subjecting them to
liability for less than the actual harm they cause.”166
160

See supra Part I.B.
For an exhaustive empirical study of the use of various factors (including many found in the Baird
test) by federal courts, see Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 4, at 78–96.
162 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992)
(emphasis omitted).
163 Id. at 559–60. This Comment does not assume that the words “rule” and “standard” cover the vast
array of possibilities for lawmaking, but rather will use them out of convenience. See id. at 561 (“The language
of this Article will follow the common practice of referring to rules and standards as if one were comparing
pure types, even though legal commands mix the two in varying degrees.”).
164 Id. at 621. Kaplow further posits that “[r]ules are more costly to promulgate than standards because
rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors
to predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations of the law’s content.”
Id. at 562–63.
165 Id. at 621.
166 Id. at 591. Kaplow ultimately concludes that the desirability of a rule or a standard in any given
situation depends on a finite and measurable number of variables. See id. at 621–23.
161
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Kaplow’s assertions underscore that an open-ended, amorphous standard is
the better application of the implied good faith test. While all Chapter 7 cases
are subject to the “for cause” provision, filings that will actually incur a motion
based on the “for cause” provision are rare.167 Decidedly, the behavior this law
seeks to regulate is not frequent (at least relative to other forms of bankruptcy
behavior that would be litigated, such as abuse in the consumer bankruptcy
context).168 Utilizing a rule in the case of the “for cause” provision would also
work hardship on debtors by both over- and under-deterring the abusive
behavior it seeks to regulate.169 Bankruptcy courts would dismiss the cases of
good faith debtors for behaviors that are less costly than allowing the cases to
proceed; other debtors would abstain from filing because they wrongly believe
their behaviors are covered by the rule. Thus, the appropriate and least costly
method of law to be applied in this case, according to Kaplow’s framework, is
a standard.170
By adopting an open-ended inquiry but endorsing the Baird factors,171 the
Eleventh Circuit has de facto established a rule as the guiding principle for the
“for cause” inquiry. While factor tests are commonly seen as standards, the
fifteen Baird factors fall neatly within Kaplow’s definition of a rule as
“entail[ing] an advance determination of what conduct is permissible, leaving
only factual issues for the adjudicator.”172 By extensively documenting the
behaviors that are considered “bad faith,” the Baird factors leave no discretion
to the adjudicator but to decide whether the facts of the debtor’s case fit the
rubric. Further, these factors “give content to the law . . . before . . . individuals

167 Available statistical evidence suggests that abuse dismissal motions are infrequent. See Stephen J.
Spurr & Kevin M. Ball, The Effects of a Statute (BAPCPA) Designed to Make It More Difficult for People to
File for Bankruptcy, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 27 (2013). This data does not reflect abuse dismissal motions under
the “for cause” provision. However, because dismissals under the “for cause” provision are likely less frequent
than dismissals under the “consumer abuse” provision (owing to the number of Chapter 7 cases involving
“primarily business debt” and directly implicating the “for cause” provision being less than the number of
Chapter 7 cases with “primarily consumer debt”), this Comment will accept for purposes of the argument that
the above data is representative.
168 Id.
169 See id.; cf. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV. 23, 38–39 (2000) (“[B]ecause of unsystematic imperfection or rational concern with the cost of
adjudication, adjudicators might fail to apply a standard precisely in particular cases. Consequently, standards
can be over- or underinclusive as applied.”).
170 See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
172 Kaplow, supra note 162, at 560; see also Korobkin, supra note 169, at 28 (“Multi-factor balancing
tests are less pure and more rule-like than requirements of ‘reasonableness’ because they specify ex
ante . . . what facts are relevant to the legal determination.”).
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act.”173 The Baird factors have crystallized the behaviors that satisfy an
inherently amorphous concept—in the Eleventh Circuit, bad faith has a neat
prescription.
The better result would have been for the Piazza court to expressly adopt
an amorphous implied good faith inquiry174 rather than obliquely approve of
the Baird factors as a viable method.175 Doing so would have been more
normatively desirable and more faithful to the core principles of bankruptcy.176
As stated previously, the core of bankruptcy is to ensure that debtors receive a
“fresh start” and to ensure that their creditors are ordered efficiently.177
Undoubtedly, a standard that conforms best to these underlying norms,
allowing maximum judicial discretion in a fairly low-cost setting, promotes
both a fresh start for needy debtors (while screening greedy debtors out of the
forum) and ensures that those debtors’ creditors are efficiently ordered.178
Professor Ted Janger, in his article Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law,
advances a more subtle reason for the promotion of “muddy” rules in the
context of abuse.179 By using a standard, bankruptcy judges implicitly
173

See Kaplow, supra note 162, at 560; cf. Korobkin, supra note 169, at 28 (“[Multifactor balancing tests]
still fall on the ‘standard’ side of the spectrum . . . because they do not specify how adjudicators should weight
[sic] the relevant factors. Consequently, citizens often cannot know with certainty ex ante whether a particular
action will be classified ex post as within or beyond the legal boundaries.” (footnote omitted)). Korobkin’s
conclusion, however, appears to be aimed at multifactor tests like the one in Tunkl v. Regents of the University
of California, which had only six factors, not fifteen. See id.
174 The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits currently have a more ideal amorphous standard as their implied
good faith inquiry. See In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Courts can determine [a debtor’s]
good faith [in filing for Chapter 7 relief] only on ad hoc basis, and must decide whether the petitioner has
abused the provisions, purpose, or spirit of bankruptcy law.”); Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick),
931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Dismissal [of a Chapter 7 case] based on lack of good faith must be
undertaken on an ad hoc basis . . . it should be confined carefully and is generally utilized only in those
egregious cases that entail concealed or misrepresented assets . . . .” (citation omitted)). Dinova v. Harris (In re
Dinova), 212 B.R. 437, 442 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts must engage in case-by-case analysis in order to
determine what constitutes ‘cause’ sufficient to warrant dismissal [of a Chapter 7 case].”).
175 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1272 (11th Cir.
2013).
176 See supra Part I.B.
177 See supra Part I.B.
178 See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985) (“By describing the
distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct in evaluative terms, standards allow the addressees
to make individualized judgments about the substantive offensiveness or nonoffensiveness of their own actual
or contemplated conduct.”).
179 By muddy rules, Janger is referring to standards. Janger, supra note 45, at 581. He elaborates:
The purpose of muddy rules is to allow such behavior to be brought before a judge, and as a
second order effect, to alert the parties to the possibility that abusive behavior (either ex ante or ex
post) will be presented to a judge and sanctioned. In short, muddy rules can and should be used in
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recognize that the market is subject to failure in this area and proactively
promulgate a rule to address the failure.180 By increasing costs (both the
financial cost of legal advice and the noneconomic cost of increased
deliberation) for all debtors, a standard serves as a cautionary device to ensure
that those willing to declare bankruptcy are also those willing to incur the cost
of dismissal.181
Further, “if one thinks that judges are institutionally better suited . . . to
resolving the dispute (be it a traditional two-party dispute or a polycentric
public dispute) than the legislature or the market, a muddy rule should be
favored over a crystal.”182 In this case, Congress has not established the
appropriate inquiry for the implied good faith requirement. Rather, Congress’s
heavy involvement with regards to rectifying abuse in consumer bankruptcy183
demonstrates inherent market failure with regards to abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code. Therefore, until Congress decides to promulgate a specific application
for the implied good faith inquiry, judges are the best suited to resolving this
particular market failure. An amorphous standard allowing bankruptcy judges
to adjudicate abuse on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis is the method best suited
to debtors, creditors, and bankruptcy judges alike.
IV. COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Comment concludes that there is no circuit split with regards to the
presence of an implied good faith inquiry in the “for cause” provision in
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and that an amorphous standard is the
preferable method of applying the implied good faith requirement. The
countervailing concerns and implications of each conclusion are different and
will be addressed differently in sections A and B.

the Bankruptcy Code to discourage inefficient non-cooperative behavior between and among
transacting parties.
Id. at 565.
180 Id. at 582.
181 Id.
182 Id.; see also id. at 586 (“If the legislature is concerned that a particular type of negotiation is likely to
give one party or another an opportunity to act opportunistically, an open-textured rule may serve to deter that
behavior both at the time of contracting, and at the time of the dispute. In short, muddy rules can be used in
bankruptcy (and elsewhere) to deter abusive behavior between and among transacting parties.” (footnote
omitted)).
183 See supra Part I.A.
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A. Implications of the Circuit Split Proposal
Resolving that there is no circuit split184 would partially address the
concerns expressed by Professors Kimlinger and Wassweiler in their article
decrying the use of the “for cause” provision as the location of an implied good
faith requirement.185 Kimlinger and Wassweiler use the purported circuit split
to support their argument that the implied good faith inquiry should not exist in
the “for cause” provision as such.186 They are essentially correct in their
argument that the implied good faith inquiry is a judicial construct without
statutory basis. However, the premise that circuit courts are at least in
agreement that the “for cause” provision can allow bankruptcy judges to
dismiss cases for bad faith indicates that the judicial construct is unanimously
recognized.
The proposal advocated in this Comment would also ameliorate the
problem expressed by Professors Rafael Pardo and Kathyrn Watts that the
policy-making of judges in the current system of bankruptcy leaves
“substantial gaps” in its procedures.187 While suggesting that the circuit split
à propos the “for cause” provision is illusory fails to resolve Pardo’s and
Watts’s central thesis that the bankruptcy system should be transitioned into
the hands of an administrative agency,188 it does ostensibly fill one of the
“substantial gaps” in policy-making of the sort they identify.189 To the extent
that this problem results in a lack of “uniformity” and “prospective clarity,”190
the knowledge that debtors in different jurisdictions can expect to find the
same sort of bad faith test would rectify those issues.
B. Countervailing Concerns Regarding the Amorphous Standard Proposal
The conclusion that the nature of the implied good faith test should be an
amorphous standard rests on literature (both specific to bankruptcy and
generally applicable to law) that suggests standards are preferable to rules in
deterring abuse.191 The debate on the ideal uses of standards and rules remains

184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

See supra notes 22–24; see also supra Part III.
Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 4, at 62.
Id. at 77–78.
See Pardo & Watts, supra note 5, at 409.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 391.
See supra Part III.
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robust and varied,192 and not everyone agrees with Professor Janger that
standards unequivocally deter abuse.193 Rather, much of the scholarship
suggests that the dialectic between standards and rules is too context specific to
allow forecasting even for one practice area of the law.194 Further, Congress
has oriented itself to creating strict rule-like tests for the purposes of deterring
abuse in the consumer bankruptcy domain.195
Nonetheless, insofar as one concrete effect of a standard is to allow judges
to perform individualized, case-specific judgments,196 a standard is the
preferable mode of application for the purposes of the implied good faith
requirement. Because the number of abuse dismissal motions that will occur
under the “for cause” provision are relatively de minimis,197 bankruptcy judges
will not suffer from the transaction costs (and related time and efficiency
concerns) of needing to apply an amorphous standard in a large number of
cases.198 Further, because many scholars agree that standards tend to be less
over- and under-inclusive than rules,199 abuse of the bankruptcy system seems
a particularly appropriate area for a standard—the costs of unjust dismissal or
unjust discharge200 are incredibly high compared to the common example of
beneficial rule application, the speeding ticket.
192 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Korobkin, supra note 169; Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
645 (1991); Schlag, supra note 178; Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
193 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 169, at 58 (“[A]n honest analyst without preconceived conclusions
must ultimately say that multiple considerations favor each type of legal form, and which form is most
desirable will depend on which set of competing costs dominate in a particular fact-specific situation.”);
Schlag, supra note 192, at 383–90 (describing the dialectic between rules and standards in various contexts).
195 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
196 See Kennedy, supra note 192, at 1688 (“The application of a standard requires the judge both to
discover the facts of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values
embodied in the standard.”); cf. Korobkin, supra note 169, at 25–26 (“Standards . . . require adjudicators . . . to
incorporate into the legal pronouncement a range of facts that are too broad, too variable, or too unpredictable
to be cobbled into a rule.”).
197 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
198 See Kaplow, supra note 162, at 573 (“Even if they are extremely costly to apply, the significant
likelihood that the particular application will never arise may make standards much cheaper.”).
199 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 192, at 1739 (“Everyone agrees that [the over- and under-inclusiveness
of rules] is a liability, but the proponent of rules is likely to argue that we should not feel too badly about it,
because those who suffer have no one to blame but themselves.”); Korobkin, supra note 169, at 56 (“Rules are
more likely to be over- and underinclusive than standards, suggesting rules are more likely to prevent desirable
behavior and permit undesirable behavior.”).
200 In the case of Craig Piazza, permitting him to proceed or dismissing him from bankruptcy was roughly
worth the cost of his single debt, $319,683. See supra note 80.
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Ultimately, the positive effects of using an amorphous standard outweigh
the potential issues with applying it. In re Piazza presents a one-step-forward,
two-steps-back scenario, and as long Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy judges apply
the rule-like Baird factors, harsh results for Chapter 7 debtors will inevitably
ensue.
CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzes the holding of a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion
and criticizes the action it took with regards to applying the implied good faith
standard. While this opinion and others state that there is a circuit split over
whether the “for cause” provision of the Bankruptcy Code should contain an
implied good faith inquiry, this Comment argues that any circuit split is based
on appearance rather than reality. All courts of appeals that have expressed an
opinion on the matter have acknowledged that they are willing to find conduct
that constitutes bad faith as cause to dismiss under the “for cause” provision.
Further, this Comment demonstrates that a true circuit split does exist with
regards to the appropriate method of inquiry for the implied good faith test,
one that has the potential to cause uncertainty for debtors. The method
endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Piazza, a fifteen-factor test, is likely
to cause hardship on debtors by both over- and under-deterring the behavior it
seeks to prevent. Instead, the ideal inquiry should be one already espoused by
several other circuits: an amorphous, open-ended good faith standard that
allows adjudicators to decide culpability on an ex post basis.
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